![]() ![]() Operations strategy in the history of war” (260). The Mississippi and Gulf as “probably one of the worst examples of combined She hyperbolically dismisses Union operations on Of Yorktown by a significantly smaller Confederate force and generally exhibited Supposed strategic visionary allowed himself to be bluffed into a tedious siege George McClellan one will read in Civil War historiography, minimizing how this Reed offers some of the most effusive praise for ![]() Too often, however, the work is overshadowed by controversial, if not To appreciate the need to combine naval bombardment with amphibious landings. Were undermined by poor coordination and that Union commanders too often failed She further persuasively argues that too often combined operations Including McClellan’s 1861 plan, and questions common assumptions about Union Reed reveals understudied aspects of the war, Sheds new light on the Union war effort, applying a professional strategicĪnalysis of combined operations which provides greater sophistication than Well-coordinated bombardment of Confederate batteries even as Union attackers Rejecting the assumption that the success of theĪrmy-Navy-Marine storm of the fort was a fait accompli, Reed argues theįort’s capture was made possible by Admiral David Porter’s daring and Marked by poor interservice communication and coordination, but the successfulĬapture of Fort Fisher in January 1865 witnessed the implementation of effectiveĬombined tactics. OperationsĪgainst Charleston and Fort Fisher (outside Wilmington, NC) were initially Advancement would be left to the tactical level. More attributable to good luck and Confederate weakness and less to successfulĬombined operations. Operations against Forts Henry and Donelson and against Vicksburg as victories Reed highlights the capture of New Orleans as a victory which would not haveīeen possible without successful Army-Navy coordination, but dismisses ![]() Union’s war effort, she argues, would be characterized by a “continental”Īpproach which failed to take maximum advantage of Northern naval superiority. General-in-chief to command solely of the Army of the Potomac and failed toĪdequately support his advance on Richmond up the James River. Reed contends McClellan’s grand strategy fellĪpart because the Lincoln administration demoted the “Young Napoleon” from Of destroying defending enemy armies in the field, promised to fragmentĬonfederate forces and cut them off from support and supplies. This Jominian strategy of maneuver, which assumed the improbability The Atlantic and Gulf Coasts and along the Mississippi, Tennessee, andĬumberland Rivers to strike into the Confederate interior and seize key rail McClellan envisioned independently formidable Army-Navy columns moving against War, a plan partially inspired by his professional observation of successfulīritish and French combined operations against the Russians in the Crimea. Strategic vision for combined operations with the potential to quickly win the Touts an early plan by George McClellan as offering a truly sophisticated She divides her history of combined operations into three stages,Ĭharacterized by 1) the evolution of Union combined strategy, 2) the collapse ofĬombined strategy in practice, and 3) the evolution of combined tactics. Reed, however, privileges policy and strategic analysis over simple Mississippi River, the failed siege of Charleston, and the amphibious capture ofįort Fisher. McClellan’s Peninsular Campaign, the capture of New Orleans, the clearing of the Overviews the major joint Army-Navy operations of the conflict, includingīurnside’s North Carolina Expedition, the taking of Forts Henry and Donelson, Strategy and that Union forces did not achieve effective combined arms tactics McClellan’s purportedly sophisticated vision for a grand combined operational Reed posits that the Union high command inadvisably forsook George One of the first studies of these combined operations during the course of theĬivil War. Most clear-cut advantages in the Civil War, but subduing the Confederacy’s vastĬoastline and interior would require strategic, operational, and tacticalĬooperation between the U.S. Naval superiority marked one of the Union’s Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1978. ![]()
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